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Abstract
Internet of Things (IoT) is a rapidly growing technology that is gaining importance
in the area of ubiquitous computing. The main aim behind this concept is to
provide communication capabilities to all the things present around us, so that
these devices can communicate directly among themselves in an intelligent manner
eliminating the need for human intervention. This communication is established
by the use of RFID tags, sensors etc., which are provided with addresses to be
uniquely identified and to communicate with each other. The main problem with
IoT is providing security and privacy. Among many wireless technologies used for
communication among devices, RFID technology is the most popular and widely
used. Various factors like reduction in terms of size, weight, energy consumption
lead to its popularity. So, in this thesis we mainly concentrate on RFID and its
security problems. Since, RFID is a wireless communication technology; it is very
easily prone to attacks and intrusions from the adversaries. So, we have to develop
strong authentication algorithms which provide maximum security so that this
technology can be used for the implementation of Internet of Things. But, the
problem is that, RFID tags consist of very low tag resources in terms of memory and
computational capabilities. It is very difficult to develop authentication protocols that
consume minimum tag resources and provide maximum security. So, our goal is to
develop lightweight authentication protocols which use simpler operations like XOR,
Rot etc. which consumes very few tag resources and aims to provide maximum security.
Keywords: IoT, RFID, Ubiquitous computing, Security and privacy
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Chapter1
Introduction
Internet of Things(IoT) is the connection between devices, which can be uniquely
identified through the IP addressing scheme and which have the capability to
communicate with other devices to attain the required objectives. IoT strives for
providing the ability to the interconnected devices in a network to transfer data without
the need of human-human interaction or human-machine interaction. It aims to provide
services directly based on machine-machine interaction.
1.1 Need for IoT
In today’s world, the Internet and the computers for the most part are dependent
on people for data. Most of the information introduced in the web today was once
captured or accumulated by individuals and accordingly made by them by either
writing, taking computerized pictures or by reading standardized tags. The problem
with this is that individuals have restricted time, consideration and precision which
implies that they are bad at capturing information about things in a certifiable
manner. Thus, if computing gadgets have the capacity to capture information from
the gadgets directly and disregard it to the web with no human intervention, then
precision and quality of information is enhanced and waste, loss and expenses are
lessened.
Internet of Things is not simply being connected as far as PCs, advanced mobile
phones, tablets and so on. It portrays a world where anything can be connected and
made to interact in a intelligent manner. In this way, for the effective execution of the
Internet of Things where millions or billions of knowledgeable devices are associated,
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the first step is changing over systems on restrictive conventions to IP based systems.
The present IPV4 addressing system which is being currently used for identifying the
computing devices will not be sufficient for the implementation of the IoT. We need to
shift to IPV6 addressing system which is 128-bit addressing and can be easily used to
address the billions of things that are going to be connected.
1.2 Applications of IoT
There are many important applications provided by IoT. A few of them as listed by
Rolf H.weber [13] are as follows:
 Transportation
 Logistics
 Health care
 Smart environments
 Security applications
1.3 RFID
RFID is a very popular technology used for identification of objects automatically
through Radio signals. The deployment of the RFID technology requires the following
three components.
 RFID Tag
 RFID Reader
 Backend Server/database
2
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1.3.1 RFID tags
RFID tags are mounted on the objects which are to be supervised. They are mounted
with small IC’s which contains an ID that can be used to uniquely identify the item
to which it is attached. Each tag in an RFID system has a specific amount of memory
internally, where the information concerned to the object can be stored. RFID tags
come in different varieties namely:
1. Read-only tags 2. Write Once Read Many (WORM) tags
3. Read/Write tags.
Tags classification according to resources is as:
1.Passive 2. Semi passive 3. Active tags.
 Passive tags:
1. They don’t have an internal clock and own power supply and depend on the
radio signals transmitted by the readers for their operation.
2. These tags are generally cheap.
3. The resource constraints like no self power source, very less internal memory
make them operationally challenging.
 Semi passive tags:
1. They have internal battery power for performing computations but they rely
on the power from the signal transmitted by the reader for transmission of
messages.
2. Prices are moderate.
 Active tags:
1. They have their own internal clock, power supply and large internal memory.
2. These tags are generally costly.
3. They have no resource constraints.
3
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RFID technology is gaining importance in the widespread implementation of IoT.
The success of this technology depend on gaining public acceptance, which requires
addressing the privacy and security problems hindering the usage of RFID tags.
1.4 Types of RFID systems
RFID systems are segregated depending on the range of frequencies with in which
they operate as:
1. Low frequency 2. High frequency 3. Ultra high frequency:
 LF RFID
– Low Frequency RFID applications work in the range of 125KHz - 132.5KHz.
– It has a short read range of approximately 10cms.
– Data read speed is very low in these RFIDs.
 HF RFID
– High frequency RFID systems operate in the frequency range of 3-30MHz.
– They have more data transfer rate compared to Low frequency RFIDs
– Read range is between 10cm-1m.
 UHF RFID
– Ultra High Frequency RFID applications operate at very high frequencies
ranging between 860MHz-960MHz.
– The data transfer rates are the highest in these RFIDs.
– The data read ramge is as high as 12m.
1.5 Working of RFID
An RFID system typically consists of these three important parts namely: A scanning
antenna, a transceiver at the reader side to decode the information on the tag and a
4
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transponder that is mounted on the RFID tag and is programmed with some data.
The RFID tags used in the system may be provided with a power supply or may not
be provided. Tags containing their own power supply have lesser life span because they
become inactive after the battery is depleted. The tags not having the power supply
have longer life spans. They take the power from the power signal from the scanner.
The scanners can be either fixed at a particular location,handheld or movable. They
can assume any shape and size depending on the application.
When a transponder of a RFID tag is made to pass through the radio frequency
signals of the scanner, the transponder at the tag gets activated,authenticates the
scanner and then transfers all its data to the transceiver. The transceiver decrypts
the data and then processes the data according to the application.
Figure 1.1: RFID working
1.6 Security threats to RFID Applications
 Eavesdropping: The attacker stores all the messages transmitted between the
sender and the reader and later does cryptanalysis of the messages stored.
 Replay attack: The adversary stops the actual messages in the communication
and instead sends the messages eavesdropped in the previous sessions to spoof as
a valid tag or a reader.
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 Cloning: Cloning is the process of reading all the information that is stored in a
valid tag and then writing the same onto another blank tag and use it as a valid
tag.
 Tag tracing: The process by which the attackers identify the location of the
tag either by communicating with it or by analysis of messages stored passively
is called tag tracing.
 Invading privacy: It means finding the information about the user without his
knowledge. For example, in a shopping transaction, finding what all items the
customer had purchased.
 Data forging: The modification of the critical information on the tag like
product price on the tag by the adversary is called data forging.
 Denial of Service: The prevention of the tag and reader to communicate with
each other.
 De synchronization: Modifying the secret information like keys shared by the
tag and reader, so that the keys between them do not match and consequently
the authentication process between them fails.
1.6.1 Physical mechanisms for RFID security
 Kill Codes: It is a method of permanently deactivating the tag. The codes on
the tag are killed and the tag becomes unresponsive to reading and tracing. This
approach is generally employed when the tracking of the object to which the tag
is attached is no longer required.
 Faraday Cage: By this method, the user can decide when he wants the tag to
be traceable. If the tag should not be traceable,then it is put in a faraday cage.
The faraday cage is built with a material that do not permit the electromagnetic
waves to pass through it. As a result, the tag cannot be tracked.
 Blocker Tag: The blocker tag prevents access to the unauthorized users by
creating an illusion that many other RFID tags are present. It jams the signal
6
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going to the actual tag from the reader. It is generally placed near the actual
tag.
1.7 Types of RFID Authentication
Authentication protocols are mainly classified into four different types as follows:
1. Ultra light weight
2. Light weight
3. Simple
4. Fully secured
 Ultralight weight: Uses only simple bitwise operations at the tag side.
 Light weight: Uses simple functions like CRC ,Psuedo random number
generator functions and bitwise operations.
 Simple: Uses hash functions along with the previously described operations.
 Fully secured: Can make use of any complex functions irrespective of the
resources they demand, but finally provide maximum security.
1.8 Motivation
Internet of Things (IoT) has recently become a buzz word among the computer
scientists. Its applications are growing day by day. The idea behind this technology is
to interconnect all the things existing around us and allowing them to interact among
themselves and exchange data. The problem for its full scale implementation is the
privacy and the security problems it is facing. The users can be tracked without even
being known that they are tracked. The things are provided with sensors mainly RFIDs
that capture the data. The sensors transfer the data to their readers. So, to provide
privacy, an authentication scheme must be established between these sensors and the
readers. This method ensures the required security and the privacy, but sophisticated
cryptography which we use for normal authentication cannot be used here because the
RFID tags used for sensing are constrained with limited resources.
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1.9 Objective of Research
The main objectives we find from the motivation to work in the area of ”Authentication
on IoT” are discussed as follows:
 Security Problem: To design such a robust authentication protocol which is
secure against all known security breeches.
 Minimum resources: As the Passive RFID tags are resource constrained, the
authentication protocol should consume minimum storage and computational
resources.
1.10 Organization of the Thesis
The organization of the rest of the thesis is as described below:
1. Chapter 1: In this chapter, we have discussed about the introduction to Internet
of Things,RFID technology and security and privacy issues associated with them,
motivation and objective of my research.
2. Chapter 2: In this chapter, we present the literature survey where I have
discussed some of the pre- existing RFID mutual authentication protocols and
the analysis of their security.
3. Chapter 3: In this chapter, we discuss about my proposed new RFID
authentication protocol and improvements to few of the existing protocols to
protect them from various security attacks.
4. Chapter 4: In this chapter, we show the implementation of the protocol and
analyze its security with the help of an automatic protocol verification tool known
as SPAN.
5. Chapter 5: In this chapter, conclusion, future scope of the research work done
are given.
8
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Literature Survey
Over the past few years, many protocols have been proposed that claimed to prevent
the vulnerabilities against authentication between the RFID tag and the reader but
have failed. The summary of few of these protocols is as follows:
2.1 LMAP RFID authentication protocol
This protocol is proposed by Peris-Lopez [14] in 2006. It is makes use of the Index
Pseudonyms(IDS). IDS is a 96 - bit index used for retrieving all the information
corresponding to a particular tag from database of the reader or a back end server.
The keys shared between the tag and the reader are divided into 4 parts K1, K2, K3,
K4 each of 96 - bit length.
In this protocol, the reader does the expensive operations like hash,random number
generation etc., while the tag which is constrained with resources, only performs simple
operations on bits like XOR, OR, AND and (2m) modulo addition. The protocol works
in the following fashion:
A = IDS ⊕ K1 ⊕ n1
B = (IDS ∨ K2) + n1
C = (IDS + K3 + n2)
D = IDS+ID ⊕ n1 ⊕ n2
IDS and Key updating:
IDSnew = (IDS + (n2 ⊕ K4)) ⊕ ID
9
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Figure 2.1: LMAP authentication protocol
K1new = K1 ⊕ n2 ⊕ (K3 + ID)
K2new = K2 ⊕ n2 ⊕ (K4 + ID)
K3new = K3 ⊕ n1 + (K1 ⊕ ID)
K4new = K4 ⊕ n1 + (K2 ⊕ ID)
2.1.1 Drawbacks of LMAP
This protocol is prone to the following attacks as proposed by G.Avione [6]:
1. Full disclosure attack.
2. De synchronization attack.
2.2 M 2AP RFID authentication protocol
M2AP is a RFID mutual authentication protocol also proposed by Peris-Lopez [9].
This protocol was assumed to provide the required amount of security by consuming
very few resources on the tag. It requires approximately 300 logic gates. The various
phases in this protocol are:
 Tag singulation.
 Mutual authentication.
10
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 IDS updating.
 Key updation.
Figure 2.2: M2AP authentication protocol
2.2.1 Drawbacks
1. Each bit is affected only by the bits which have same or higher index. So the
least significant bits are independent of the other bits in the messages.
2. This protocol also uses OR and AND bitwise operations whose result is not
equally probable. The result of AND operation can be 0 and the result of
OR operation can be 1, each with a probability of (3/4). The use of these
non-triangular operations makes it prone to tango attack.
3. From the messages B and D, the information about the random numbers n1 and
n2 can be easily acquired, with the help of 1’s and 0’s in the IDS.
4. The 296 modulo addition can be easily cracked if every bit on the right hand side
is known.
11
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2.2.2 Possible attacks
1. Tracing: If the messages of two consecutive sessions of the protocol are
eavesdropped, the attacker can easily find the value of ID and can trace it.
2. Tag impersonation.
3. Reader impersonation.
2.3 SASI mutual authentication protocol
This Ultralight weight authentication protocol is proposed by Y.Chien in 2007
[10].Ultra lightweight protocols refer to the family of protocols that involve only simple
bitwise operations like OR, AND, XOR, rotation etc. on tags. Ultra light weight
mutual authentication protocols are very useful for passive RFID tags because they
have very few internal resources.
2.3.1 Drawbacks
SASI is an ultra light weight authentication protocol, which is aimed to provide
strong authentication and integrity. The protocol suffers from the following attacks
as described by W.Phan [11].
1. De-synchronization attack which breaks the synchronization between the reader
and tag by enabling wrong computation of secrets at either of them.
2. Identity disclosure attack, through which the tag ID can be determined.
3. Full disclosure attack, through which all the secret data like the keys can be
retrieved.
2.4 Gossamer protocol: An advancement to the
ultra light weight cryptography
This protocol is designed by Peris-Lopez [12] with inspiration from SASI protocol. It
aims to be devoid of the security weaknesses of the SASI protocol. It can be employed
12
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in passive RFID tags for which ultra lightweight cryptography is the most efficient.
2.4.1 Drawbacks
The weaknesses of Gossamer protocol described by Bilal [8] included the use of
unbalanced logical operators. The vulnerabilities discovered from the analysis conclude
that many attacks like denial of service (DoS), de-synchronization, replay of messages,
data integrity violation and Index Pseudonym collision attacks are possible. Moreover,
it is computationally exhaustive.
2.5 RAPP:New ultralight weight RFID
authentication protocol using Permutation
RAPP is new ultra light weight RFID authentication protocol proposed by Y.Tian
[1]. RAPP avoids the use of unbalanced triangular operations like bitwise OR and
AND and introduces a new operation called permutation. RAPP uses very less tag
resources like computation power, storage requirement and the cost for communication.
In RAPP, tags involve mainly three operations:
 Bitwise XOR
 Left Rotation Rot()
 Permutation Per()
If X and Y are two strings of length ’l’ and the number of 1’s in Y, wt(Y ) = m then,
yk1 = yk2 = . . . . . . . . . . . . . . = ykm = 1
ykm+1 = ykm+2 = . . . . . . . . . . . = ykl = 0
Per(X, Y ) = xk1 xk2. . . . .xkm xkl xkl−1. . . . . . . . . .xkm+2 xkm+1
The permutation operation can be performed as follows:
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Figure 2.3: Permutation operation
Figure 2.4: RAPP authentication protocol
2.5.1 Drawback
This protocol suffers from the following security attacks as described by
Z.Ahmadian [2]:
 De synchronization attack
 Traceability attack
 Full disclosure attack
14
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2.6 Improved RAPP authentication protocol
This paper is modified from RAPP by Xinying Zheng [21] with the objective
to eliminate all the weaknesses of RAPP while reducing the computational and
communicational complexity.
n1 = f(K1, r)
n2 = f(r,K2)
B = per(K2⊕n1, Rot(n1, n1))⊕per(n1, n1⊕k1)
C = per(n2⊕, n2⊕K2)⊕ID
Key Updating Process :
IDSnew= per(IDS, n1⊕n2)⊕K1⊕K2
K1new = per(K1, n1)⊕n1
K2new = per(K2, n2)⊕n2
Figure 2.5: Improved RAPP authentication protocol
2.6.1 Drawbacks
This protocol shows reduced time and space complexities compared to the previous
protocols and also resist the previously proposed attacks against RAPP . But this
protocol is prone to IDS collision attack.
The reader generates the new tag pseudonym (IDSnew) after each successful protocol
run, but it does not check if the generated IDS is already stored in the database
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corresponding to another tag. So, if the collision of tag Pseudonyms occurs then the
reader may fetch wrong values of keys and there is a possibility for the tag and the
reader to get de-synchronized.
2.7 SIDRFID authentication protocol
This protocol is proposed by Lee Y.C [7].In this, the tag and the reader have identifiers
IDT and IDR respectively, which are used in the authentication process. This protocol
aims to consume minimum memory storage and computation requirements on the tag.
The identifiers of the tag and the reader remain static in all sessions of the protocol.
So, this type of protocols find uses in applications where one-time authentication is
sufficient. The protocol working can be demonstrated as follows:
Figure 2.6: SIDRFID authentication protocol
S = R⊕IDR
P = IDT⊕Rot(R, IDR)
Q = Rot(IDT, IDT )⊕Rot(R,R)
Z = Rot(IDT, IDR⊕R)⊕Rot(IDR, IDT⊕R)
where R is the Random number and Rot(x, y) is the circular left shift rotation operation
by hamming weight(y) positions.
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2.7.1 Drawbacks
The following are the drawbacks on SIDRFID authentication protocol [5, 6]:
1. Passive hamming weight disclosure attack: The hamming weight of IDR
can be determined when the attacker eavesdrops two consecutive sessions of the
protocol and obtain the values of S, P .
2. Full disclosure attack: This is an active attack where the attacker acts as an
actual tag and sends messages to the reader. The attacker eavesdrops one round
of the authentication and approximately 95 messages sent to the tag (if the key
length is assumed to be 96 - bits)
2.8 DIDRFID authentication protocol
In this protocol proposed by Lee.Y.C [7], the tag uses an identifier DIDT which gets
updated after every successful authentication session. The tag and the reader shares a
secret key K which is used for reader authentication by the tag. A random number R
is generated by the reader which is used for tag authentication by the reader.
The protocol working can be demonstrated as follows:
Figure 2.7: DIDRFID authentication protocol
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A = K⊕R
B = Rot(K,K)⊕Rot(R,R)
C = Rot(K,R)⊕Rot(R,K)
2.8.1 Drawbacks
The following are the weaknesses on DIDRFID authentication protocol [5]:
1. Passive weight disclosure attack : The attacker checks the messages B and
C exchanged between the tag and the reader by eavesdropping them, until they
are equal. If they both are equal hamming weight of R will be equal to hamming
weight of K. By using the message A eavesdropped in two consecutive sessions
of the protocol, their hamming weights can be easily determined.
2. Traceability attack: If the final message C sent by tag doesn’t reach the reader,
then the reader will not be able to update the DIDT with the new value and
thus allows the attacker to replay the values of A,B and consequently trace the
tag.
2.9 Comparison of various authentication protocols
Parameter LMAP M2AP SASI Gossamer RAPP Improved RAPP
Type of Computation operations +,⊕,∨ +,⊕,∨,∧ +,⊕,∨,Rot +,⊕,Mixbits +,⊕,Rot +,⊕,Rot
Storage requirement 6L 6L 7L 7L 5L 4L
Communication messages 2 3 2 2 2 2
Resistance to De synchronization attack No No No No No Yes
Resistance to disclosure attack No No No Yes No Yes
Resistance to tag tracking No No No Yes No Yes
Resistance to IDS collision attack No No No No No No
Table 2.1: Comparison of various authentication protocols in terms of security and
resource requirements
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2.10 SUMMARY
The following figure shows the summary of security of various authentication protocols
[21]:
Figure 2.8: Comparison of various authentication protocols
19
Chapter3
Proposed Work
3.1 RFID mutual authentication protocol using
shuﬄebits
3.1.1 Introduction
RFID is a fast evolving technology that is rapidly gaining importance in the area
of ubiquitous computing which enables the smart devices to communicate anywhere.
So providing security to the RFID system is very important. But the drawback with
RFID systems is that, the low cost and low frequency RFID tags which are mostly used
have very less resources associated with them. The resources can be computational or
storage capabilities and battery power. Earlier many RFID mutual authentication
protocols which are lightweight in nature, are proposed to serve this purpose. Most
of them suffered from several security attacks. So, a new lightweight authentication
protocol making use of simple operations like XOR, left circular rotation and shuﬄebits
is proposed which aims to meet the security and privacy demands of the RFID system.
This proposed protocol mainly uses two bitwise operations namely:
1. OR 2. Shuﬄebits
The shuﬄebits operation internally uses the left circular shift operation.
The notations that are used in this protocol are as follows:
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Symbol Meaning
NR Reader generated Random number
NT Tag generated Random number
ID Unique tag identifier
K1old Old value of key K1
K1new new value of key K1
K2old old value of key K2
K2new new value of key K2
A,B,C,D Transmission messages used for authentication between the tag and the reader
 circular left shift by mod(2l) bits
wt(x) No of bits containing ’1’ in x
⊕ XOR operation
Table 3.1: Notations used in RFID protocol using shuﬄebits
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3.1.2 Shuﬄebits() operation
Consider P and Q to be bit strings of lengths ‘l’and ‘l’respectively denoted as:
P = {p1, p2, p3, p4. . .pl}
Q = {q1, q2, q3, q4. . .ql}
Result: K = shuﬄebits(A)
1 s = 0, e =l,temp = 0,i = 1;
2 while i ≤ l do
3 instructions;
4 if ((P[ i ] ⊕ P[ i+1 ]) == 0) then
5 if ((temp == 0)) then
6 Q[ s++ ] = P[ i ];
7 else
8 Q[ e– ] = P[ i ];
9 end
10 else
11 if ((temp == 1)) then
12 Q[ e– ] = P[ i ];
13 else
14 Q[ s++ ] =P[ i ];
15 end
16 end
17 temp =P[ i ] ⊕ P[ i+1 ];
18 i++;
19 end
20 K = (Q )  Q mod (2l );
Algorithm 1: Algorithm for Shuﬄebits operation
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Figure 3.1: RFID mutual authentication protocol using shuﬄebits()
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3.1.3 Detailed working of the protocol proposed
STEP 1: Consider a Reader and a Tag which stores {ID, K1old, K2old, K1new,
K2new} and {ID, K1, K2} respectively.
STEP 2: Reader generates a random number NR and sends it to the tag.
STEP 3: The tag calculates C = shuﬄebits(K1 ⊕ K2) and sends the value
to the reader.
STEP 4: The reader then calculates Cold and Cnew values and compares them
with the received C value. If C matches with Cold then the old set of keys are used in
the further authentication process. On the other hand if C matches with Cnew then
the new set of keys are used for further authentication where the values of Cold =
shuﬄebits (K1old ⊕ K2old) and Cnew = shuﬄebits(K1new ⊕ K2new).
STEP 5: The tag also generates a random number NT . The tag then calculates A
and B values and sends them to the reader. A = shuﬄebits(NR ⊕ K1) ⊕ NT , B =
K1⊕ shuﬄebits(ID⊕NR).
STEP 6: The reader then calculates NT as, NT = shuﬄebits(NR ⊕K1) and
then calculates B′ = K1 ⊕ shuﬄebits(ID⊕NR). If the calculated B′ and the received
B are same then the tag authentication by the reader is successful. The reader then
calculates D = shuﬄebits(NT ⊕ K2) ⊕ K1 and sends it to the tag. The reader then
updates its key values as :
If C = Cold then K1new = shuﬄebits(NT ⊕ K1) and K2new = shuﬄebits(NR ⊕ K2),
otherwise if C = Cnew then K1old = K1new, K2old = K2new, K1new = shuﬄebits(NT
⊕ K1) and K2new = shuﬄebits(NR ⊕ K2).
STEP 7: The tag calculates D′ = shuﬄebits(NT ⊕ K2) ⊕ K1. If D′ and the
received D are same then the reader is successfully authenticated by the tag and
it updates it key values as K1 = shuﬄebits(NT ⊕K1) and K2 = shuﬄebits(NR ⊕K2).
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3.1.4 Analysis of security of the protocol proposed
Data security and Integrity of the message:
In the proposed algorithm data security is maintained and integrity of the message is
attained since all the secrets used in the authentication protocol are never transmitted
in plain text but in some encrypted form by shuﬄing the bits. In tag only its ID is
fixed and the key value gets updated in every run of the protocol.
Mutual authentication:
The random number NT generated by tag and the keys K1 and K2 are known only
to tag and reader. In the authentication sub messages, bits of these messages are
scrambled and sent. So, unless the attacker can guess these values, he cannot decipher
the authentication sub messages. Guessing the secrets is also very tough because they
are sent in encrypted form.
Tag anonymity:
The random values NR, NT and Keys differ for each authentication round of the
protocol. The shuﬄebits() function shuﬄes the values of these bits and moreover,
the tag ID is also not sent in plain text form. So, the tag remains anonymous to the
attacker.
Prevention of tracing attack:
All the messages exchanged in this protocol use random values and the bits are also
shuﬄed, which imparts a property of randomness to the exchanged messages also and
makes them untraceable.
Protection against Replay attack:
The Random values used in the protocol makes the message values different for each
run of the protocol. These random value NT and the keys cannot be found out as NR
is shuﬄed and XORed with keys. So, the messages cannot be replayed.
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Forward Security:
Messages captured in a particular authentication round cannot give any information
about the secrets to be used in the next authentication round because, the updation
process makes use of shuﬄebits() operation on the random numbers which is then
XORed with secret keys.
3.1.5 Protection against Impersonation attack:
In the protocol, messages B and C are used for tag authentication and reader
authentication respectively, the values of which cannot be guessed or modified. So,
the protocol is secure against impersonation attacks.
Protection from De-synchronization attack:
In this protocol the reader stores the values of both old and new keys (K1old, K1new,
K2old, K2new) to protect the protocol against de-synchronization attack. The tag sends
Shuﬄebits(K1, K2) to the reader at the beginning of the authentication. Based on
the value of that, the reader can understand if the tag was able to update its value
in the previous authentication round of protocol. If the tag is unable to update its
keys then the reader makes use the old values of keys stored in database for further
authentication.
3.2 Further Improvements to Improved RAPP
authentication protocol
The Improved RAPP algorithm provides resistance against the De-synchronization,
disclosure and tag tracing attacks, the original RAPP algorithm is prone to,but still
one attack is remained un addressed by the authors, which is the IDS collision attack.
The algorithm generates a new IDS at the end of each authentication round. But it
fails to check if that IDS is already present in the database corresponding to another
tag, which may lead to De-synchronization attack.
The different notations that are used can be described as follows:
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Symbol Meaning
IDSold Old Index Pseudonym used for identification of tag.
IDSnew New Index Pseudonym used for identification of tag.
ID Unique tag identifier.
K1old Old value of key K1.
K1new new value of key K1.
K2old old value of key K2.
K2new new value of key K2.
r, B,C Transmission messages used for authentication between the tag and the reader.
n1 Reader generated random number
n2 Tag generated random number.
per() permutation operation.
Rot() Rotation operation.
Table 3.2: Notations used for Improved RAPP authentication protocol
3.2.1 Protocol working
The protocol run and the messages exchanged are as follows:
Figure 3.2: Improved RAPP authentication protocol
r = rot(per(ID,K1)⊕n1, K2)
B = per(K2⊕n1, rot(n1, n1))⊕per(n1, n1⊕K2)
C = per(n2⊕K1, n2⊕K2)⊕n1
n2 = per(K1, K2)⊕n1
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Updating:
IDSold = IDSnew, K1old = K1new, K2old = K2new
IDSnew = per(n1, n1⊕K1)⊕K2
K1new = per(K1old, n2)⊕K2old
K2new = per(K2old, n2)⊕K1old
rold = r
3.2.2 Security Analysis
Resistance to IDS collision attack: In this modified protocol, we generate a new
value for IDS using a random number and check in the database if it is already existing.
If already existing, then a new value of IDS is generated and selected as the IDS for the
next session of the protocol. So, the protocol can be protected from the IDS collision
attack.
3.3 Improved SIDRFID authentication protocol
Lee proposed a static identity based RFID mutual authentication protocol known
as SIDRFID authentication protocol. In this protocol,the tag and the reader are
associated with identities namely IDT and IDR respectively. These identities remain
fixed for all authentication rounds of the protocol. A random number R is generated
by the reader. But, unfortunately this protocol is prone to various security attacks as
described in the earlier chapter. So, we make slight modifications to this protocol to
make it resistant to all the proposed security attacks.
In this protocol, we use a different function named Halfrot() instead of the Rot()
function used in the original protocol. The halfrot() function works as follows:
Halfrot(X,Y)
Step 1: p = HW(X)+HW(Y)
Step 2: p1 = p mod(48)
step 3: p2 = 48-p1
Step 4: Left rotate XL(Left half of message X) by p1 positions and left rotate
XR(Right half of message X) by p2 positions.
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Step 5: Concatenate XL and XR after rotation.
The working of the protocol can be described as follows:
Figure 3.3: Improved SIDRFID authentication protocol
S = R ⊕ IDR
P = IDT ⊕ Halfrot(R, IDR∨R)
Q = Halfrot(IDT, IDT∧R)⊕Halfrot(R∧IDT,R)
Z = Halfrot(IDT, IDR∨R)⊕Halfrot(IDR, IDT∧R)
3.3.1 Step by Step working of the protocol
1. STEP 1:The reader generates the message S = R⊕IDR and sends it to the tag.
2. STEP 2:The tag generates the value R from message S as R = S⊕IDR and
then calculates the messages P and Q.
3. STEP 3:The tag calculates the value of IDT from message P as
IDT =P⊕Halfrot(R, IDR∨R). Using the calculated IDT, it calculates Q value
and checks if the received and the calculated Q are same or not. If they are not
same, it means the attacker has modified the message and the protocol stops. If
they are same then tag calculates the value of Z and sends to the reader.
4. STEP 4:The reader calculates Z value and compares it with the received value
of Z.If both match,then the tag is authenticated by the reader
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3.3.2 Security Analysis
Traceability: The traceability attack which is performed on the actual protocol is not
possible in this protocol, because the rotation is not solely dependent on the hamming
weight of the second parameter of the rotation operation.
Hamming weight Disclosure: The hamming weight cannot be disclosed by using
the new Halfrot() operation.
Full Disclosure attack: Full disclosure of the secrets is also not possible. This is due
to the failure to find the hamming weight of the secrets.
3.4 Improvement to DIDRFID authentication
protocol
This protocol is also proposed by Lee, but unlike the previous one it has dynamic tag
identifier DIDT and Key K which keeps on changing for each successful authentication
round of the protocol. But this protocol also suffers from traceability attack. So, we
propose an improvement to this protocol. The message sequence in the protocol is as
follows:
Figure 3.4: Improved DIDRFID authentication protocol
A = K⊕R
B = Halfrot(K,∼ K∨R)⊕Halfrot(R,R)
C = Halfrot(K,R)⊕Halfrot(R,K∨∼ R)
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Key updating:
DIDTold = DIDT
Kold = K
DIDTnew = Halfrot(R,R∨K)⊕Halfrot(K,R∧K)
Knew = Halfrot(R,R∧K)⊕Halfrot(K,R∨K)
3.4.1 Working of the protocol
1. STEP 1:The tag sends DIDT of tag to the reader.
2. STEP 2:The reader checks for DIDT in database and if it matches with the
DIDT old then Kold is fetched, else if it matches with DIDTnew, then Knew is
fetched.The reader then calculates messages A and B and sends to the tag.
3. STEP 3:The tag calculates the value of RT from message A as R =A⊕K.Using
the calculated K, it calculates B value and checks if the received and the calculated
B are same or not. If they are not same, it means the attacker has modified the
message and the protocol stops. If they are same then tag calculates the value
of C and sends to reader.After sending C it updates its DIDT and Key K.
4. STEP 4:The reader calculates C value and compares it with the received value
of C.If both match,then the tag is authenticated by the reader and the reader
updates its DIDT and key K.
3.4.2 Security analysis
1. Passive weight disclosure:The hamming weight disclosure becomes impossible
even if the messages exchanged are eavesdropped, because of the new Halfrot()
operation.
2. Full Disclosure:The random number generated by the reader is calculated
using message A and verified using message B. So, the random number cannot
be modified by the adversary and the replaying of messages used for disclosure
attack becomes impossible.
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Simulation and Verification results
4.1 Simulation of New Improved RAPP mutual
authentication Protocol
The old RAPP algorithm and the new RAPP authentication algorithm proposed
to eliminate the IDS collision attack are implemented in java using client-server
programming and using oracle as the backend database.
The comparison between the existing and the new protocol with respect to the
resources required at the tag side are as follows:
Parameter New RAPP Improved RAPP
Type of Computation operations 11 XOR,6 per,1 Rot,2 PRF 10 XOR,8 per,2 Rot
Storage requirement 4L 4L
Communication messages 5 5
Resistance to IDS collision attacks No Yes
Table 4.1: Comparison of new RAPP and Improved RAPP authentication protocol
The following screen shots show how the former algorithm is prone to IDS collision
attack and how the improved algorithm, which we proposed overcomes it by generating
a new value of IDS and checking it across the database for prior existence corresponding
to another tag.
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The values of keys and IDS for one round of successful authentication between the
tag and reader are as shown below:
In the old RAPP authentication protocol, when the IDS generated is already
Figure 4.1: Modified RAPP Reader side
Figure 4.2: Modified RAPP Tag side
present in the database of the reader, the values of secrets fetched by the tag and the
reader mismatch and the authentication between them permanently fails. From the
simulation, different values of keys at the tag and the reader side can be seen.
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Figure 4.3: Reader side execution of RAPP when prone to IDS collision attack.
Figure 4.4: Tag side execution of RAPP when prone to IDS collision attack.
In the new RAPP authentication algorithm after proposing the required
modifications, when IDS for the next session is generated, it is checked against the
reader’s database to find out if it is already present or not. If it is already present,
a new value of IDS will be generated and used.The simulation result, shows how the
IDS collision attack occurred and is resolved in the new protocol.
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4.2 Simulation of RFID authentication protocol
using shuﬄebits
Simulation result of one round of authentication of RFID authentication protocol using
Shuﬄebits() operation is as follows:
Figure 4.5: Reader side execution of RFID protocol with Shuﬄebits
Figure 4.6: Tag side execution of RFID protocol with SHuﬄebits
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4.3 Simulation of SIDRFID mutual authentication
protocol
Figure 4.7: Reader side execution of SIDRFID
Figure 4.8: Tag side execution of SIDRFID
The comparison between the existing and the new protocol with respect to the
resources required at the tag side are as follows:
Parameter Old SIDRFID New SIDRFID
Type of Computation operations 4 ⊕, 5 Rot 4 ⊕,5 Halfrot, 2 ∨,2 ∧
Storage requirement 2L 2L
Communication messages 4 4
Resistance to HW disclosure attack No Yes
Resistance to Traceability attack No Yes
Table 4.2: Comparison of old SIDRFID and improved SIRFID authentication protocols
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4.4 Simulation of DIDRFID mutual authentication
protocol
Figure 4.9: Reader side execution of DIDRFID
Figure 4.10: Tag side execution of DIDRFID
The comparison between the existing and the new protocol with respect to the
resources required at the tag side are as follows:
Parameter Old DIDRFID New DIDRFID
Type of Computation operations 5⊕, 8 Halfrot,2 ∨,2 ∧ 5 ⊕,8 Halfrot,4 ∨,2 ∧,2 ∼
Storage requirement 2L 2L
Communication messages 4 4
Resistance to HW disclosure attack No Yes
Resistance to Full disclosure attack No Yes
Table 4.3: Comparison of old DIDRFID and Improved SIRFID authentication
protocols
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4.5 Verification using SPAN animator
AVISPA(Automated Validation of Internet Security Protocol) [19] is a tool for
verifying the security of large scale internet protocols. AVISPA uses a language called
HLPSL(High Level Protocol Specification Language) for specifying the protocol which
is more clear and more detailed compared to the traditional Alice-Bob representation
of the protocol. This language is also more difficult to specify.
SPAN(Security Protocol Animator for AVISPA) [16] is a tool which uses CAS+
language for protocol specification. This language is far easy compared to the HLPSL.
SPAN also has the capability of converting the CAS+ language specifications into
HLPSL directly. It can also generate Message sequence charts and also can build
active attacks on the specified protocol. It uses four backends for validation of the
protocols namely:
1. OFMC 2.CL-ATSE 3.SATMC 4.TA4SP
The architecture of the tool is as follows:
Figure 4.11: Tag side
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4.5.1 Verification of Improved RAPP authentication protocol
(a) Verification using OFMC (b) verification using CL-ATSE
Figure 4.12: Verification of new improved RAPP protocol using SPAN
4.5.2 Verification of authentication protocol using shuﬄebits
(a) Verification using OFMC (b) verification using CL-ATSE
Figure 4.13: Verification of new RFID protocol using Shuﬄebits in SPAN
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4.5.3 Verification of former SIDRFID authentication protocol
(a) Verification using OFMC (b) verification using CL-ATSE
Figure 4.14: Verification of original SIDRFID authentication protocol in SPAN
Figure 4.15: Message sequence chart for Attack trace on sidrfid protocol
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4.5.4 Verification of former DIDRFID authentication protocol
(a) Verification using OFMC (b) verification using CL-ATSE
Figure 4.16: Verification of original DIDRFID authentication protocol in SPAN
Figure 4.17: Message sequence chart for Attack trace on didrfid protocol
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4.5.5 Verification of modified SIDRFID authentication
protocol
(a) Verification using OFMC (b) verification using CL-ATSE
Figure 4.18: Verification of modified SIDRFID protocl using SPAN
4.5.6 Verification of modified DIDRFID authentication
protocol
(a) Verification using OFMC (b) verification using CL-ATSE
Figure 4.19: Verification of modified DIDRFID protocol using SPAN
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Figure 4.20: SPAN screen
Protocol OFMC CL-ATSE
Improved RAPP SAFE SAFE
RFID protocol using Shuﬄebits SAFE SAFE
Old SIDRFID SAFE UNSAFE
New SIDRFID SAFE SAFE
Old DIDRFID SAFE UNSAFE
New DIDRFID SAFE SAFE
Table 4.4: Comaparison of security of various protocols as determined by SPAN
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Conclusion
IoT is gaining importance tremendously with its wide range of applications. The use
of RFID technology which is very useful in establishment of IoT , is also increasing
parallelly. So, the the problems with security and privacy associated with this
technology should be carefully addressed. RFID tags come with different specifications
and design.Low cost and passive RFID tags donot have enough resources associated
with them to perform standard cryptographic functions like complex hash functions,
pseudo random generator functions etc. So, to use RFID technology for IoT, we need to
design minimal cost authentication protocols while ensuring that the required security
goals are achieved. We also need to consider the limitations of this technology.
In this thesis, we have considered few authentication protocols suitable for low cost
passive RFID tags and analysed their security properties and proposed modifications to
them.We have also designed a new authentication protocol that makes use of Shuﬄebits
operation.From the simulation results and the verification using the SPAN animator,
it can be concluded that the proposed new protocols are resistant to the attacks which
could not be handled by the former protocols. The proposed protocols compared to
their original ones provide improved security features. The new protocols use better
techniques for providing the security. So, this infers that the objective of our project
to design robust authentication protocols using the minimal resources on RFID tags is
achieved.
Scope for Further Research
In future new authentication protocols can be proposed that are more robust and
secure, consumes minimum resources on tags and requires minimum data storage.
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